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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates how competition in the media affects the quality of news. In our 
model, demand for news depends on the market perception of the media’s ability to 
receive correct information: it is positive if and only if news is potentially useful for the 
voting decision. When the media receives information which contradics commonly 
shared priors, it either reports this information or it confirms the priors: “most likely, my 
information is correct, but my potential buyers may be unable to assess the quality of 
news and attribute it according to common priors”. We ask whether competition may 
help to elicit information from the media. Our answer is positive when news covers 
issues on which the priors are sufficiently precise, or the follow-up quality assessment is 
a likely event. However, when news concerns controversial issues and it is hardly 
possible to assess its quality, competitive pressures induce confirmatory reporting. 
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1 Introduction
The media reports news about the ongoing political process, and the voters
use this information in their decisions at the ballot box. For example, Della
Vigna and Kaplan (2006) nd that Republicans gained votes in US towns
which introduced Conservative Fox News Channel between October 1996
and November 2000; in eld experiment by Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan
(2006) subscription for a new press outlet increased the probability of voting
Democratic in 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election.
The media has a high degree of freedom in reporting: it can lie, if not
directly by fabricating news, then at least indirectly, by reporting facts in
favour of some view and downplaying other facts. A growing body of litera-
ture shows that the media abuses this freedom and biases news. For example,
Groseclose and Milyo (2005) compare think tank quotes by the media and the
congressmen, and they nd that ideological location by almost all sampled
outlets lies to the left of the average congressmen.1
Most models of media bias advance the view of competition in the media
as delivering greater accuracy of news, because it facilitates the detection of
lies in reporting when they occur (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2007); increase
di¢ culties for politicians in capturing the media (Besley and Prat, 2004);
mitigates negative impact from advertiser inuence (Ellman and Germano,
2004). Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) emphasize, however, that competi-
tion in the media increases the variety-, but not the quality of news: news-
papers conrm reader prejudices, and when the prejudices di¤er, competing
outlets separate themselves in the market, in spirit of a classic Hotelling
model. In Baron (2004), competition creates di¤erentiation on quality di-
mension, and it may actually decrease the average quality: readers would
like to be aware of bad circumstances; journalists bias reports towards bad
1However, it lies in-between the average Democrat and the average Republican.
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news, and newspapers charge the readers for mitigating journalist bias. In
a competitive environment, an outlet nds its nichein the market: it sells
either more biased and cheaper news to more awareness-demanding readers;
or more accurate and more expensive news to braverreaders.
We would like to better understand how competition in the media a¤ects
the quality of news. We build a model addressing this issue. We assume
that a uniform constituency of voters may buy news to decide upon the
vote.2 Their demand depends on their perception of the media ability to
know which voting decision is the best, call it the media reputation. They
form it on the basis of previously reported news. If they can assess its the
quality, that is, tell whether news is correct or wrong, they attribute
high reputation for reporting correct news. Otherwise, they attribute high
reputation for reporting news which is likely to be correct à priori. The media
reports so as to increase its future demand. When it receives information
contradicting common priors, it hesitates whether to report it or to conrm
the priors: most likely, this information is correct, but the voters may be
unable to assess the quality of news.
We consider two media market structures: a monopoly and a duopoly;
and we ask which one is more e¢ cient in sustaining informative reporting.
Our answer depends on news coverage: a duopoly media market delivers news
no less informative than a monopoly media market when it covers issues on
which the priors are su¢ ciently precise or the follow-up quality assessment is
a likely event. However, if news concerns controversial issues, and the follow-
up quality assessment is hardly possible, news is more informative when the
media is a monopoly.
The reason is the following. When news covers issues on which the pri-
ors are su¢ ciently di¤used (for example, it concerns some national policy,
2The voters attach a value to voting optimally, either directly as a psychic benet,
or because they take a private decision, say an investment, whose impact depends on the
same information as the one relevant to the voting decision.
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e.g.: scal-, welfare-, international-, or it forecasts closeelection), the vot-
ers are eager to buy some news to get a better idea. If the media is a
monopoly, they buy news unless previously reported news turns out to be
wrong. Therefore, the media reports any information it receives, whether it
conrms common priors or not: most likely, it is correct. A duopoly media
market gives more opportunities to the voters: they can choose the source of
news; and they can crosscheckreports by di¤erent media to see whether
at least one of them conrms the priors. When the outlets have similar rep-
utations, the voters crosschecktheir news. Otherwise, they buy news only
by the outlet with a higher reputation, because it is su¢ cient for their voting
decision. Competition for reputational leadership creates the incentives to
conrm the priors: if one outlet conrms the priors, the other outlet op-
poses them, and the voters cannot tell which news is correct, they attribute
a higher reputation to the outlet that reported conrmatory news, so it wins
the market. Given such incentives, the outlets do not engage in conrmatory
reporting if and only if the probability of the follow-up quality assessment
lies su¢ ciently high (which may be true for electoral forecasts, but not for
news concerning controversial policy issues).
At the same time, when news covers issues on which common priors are
more precise (say, some local public project: opening pollution-cleanup sites
in Albany, construction of an expressway in Pittsburgh, etc.), the voters are
more pickyat buying news if the media is a monopoly (they already have
some prior idea); and they are more eager to crosscheck whether some
news conrms the priors when the media is a duopoly. They buy news by a
monopoly media only if previously reported news turns out to be correct, or
at least it is likely to be correct à priori. They crosschecknews by di¤erent
outlets when their previously reported news is coherent, whether it conrms
the priors or not (it only should not be clearly wrong). Hence, when the
media is a duopoly, it has weaker incentives to conrm the priors, so news is
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more informative.3
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews related lit-
erature. Section 3 models a monopoly media market. Section 4 describes
circumstances in which it delivers informative news. Section 5 extends the
basic model to a duopoly media market, and compares the quality of news
for di¤erent market structures. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of
possible applications and extensions. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
We frame our game as a market for political news. However, our insights
apply to any market in which professional intermediaries (e.g.: nancial ex-
perts, commercial- or political consultants, medical doctors) sell their advice
for private decisions. We model a monopoly media reporting as reputational
cheap-talk in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006a,b,c). In their game, an expert
reports the prevailing state of the world based on his private signal. The qual-
ity of the signal depends on the experts type or smartness: the smarter the
expert, the better is his signal, hence, the closer its realizations to the prior
mean of the state. In order to appear as smart as possible, the expert biases
report to the prior mean (likewise, in our model a monopoly media signals
its high quality by foregoing its information and conrming common priors
when they are su¢ ciently precise). In a game with multiple experts equilib-
rium reporting is the same as in the basic one-expert game, if the experts
continue to receive von Neumann-Morgenstern payo¤s and hold conditionally
independent signals (Section 7, 2006a); and it is excessively di¤erentiated in
the winner-takes-it-all competition (2006c).
Our counterpart to the game with multiple experts is a game with two
3More precisely, for either market structure news is informative if and only if the
probability of the follow-up quality assessment lies above some threshold. This threshold,
however, is lower when the market is a duopoly.
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media outlets. We do not assume any functional dependence between the
media absolute- or relative reputation in the market and its payo¤or demand:
it is positive if and only if news is perceived to be useful for the voting
decision. This approach is novel in the literature. Otherwise, reputational
cheap-talk by the media has already been discussed by Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2007); however, when they consider a game with several media outlets, they
eventually focus on reporting by one outlet assuming that the other media
report perfect information which the readers can buy as a feedback.
Our paper is complementary to a growing literature on reputational herd-
ing. This literature analyses sequential reporting by several agents with
reputational concerns, assuming conditional correlation (either positive or
negative) of signals by smart agents. In a seminal model by Scharfstein
and Stein (1990), two agents (managers) make investment decisions, on the
basis of their private signals about investment protability: an agents signal
is informative if he is smartand di¤used if he is dumb. If both agents
are smart, they have the same signals; otherwise, their signals are indepen-
dent. One agent decides rst. Because the same decisions signal smartness,
the agent moving the second mimics decision by the rst mover: there is
reputational herding.4 The mirror image is antiherding: if signals by smart
agents are less correlated than signals by dumb agents, an agent behaves dif-
ferently from his precessor (Hirshleifer, 1993; Graham, 1999). Similarly, in Li
(2006), an agent who receives two signals of increasing quality makes di¤erent
reports following the signals (changes his mind), because his information
should improve faster if he is smart. E¢ nger and Polborn (2001) investigate
whether there is herding or antiherding depending on concerns for relative
reputation. They assume that there a value of being the only smartagent
in the market. When it is su¢ ciently low, the second mover herds, avoiding
4Reputational herding di¤ers from informational herding: an agent may mimic behavior
if his precessors because it is more indicative than his own information (Banerjee, 1992).
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performing worse than the rst mover. Otherwise, he antiherds, signalling
that either he or his precessor is smart, but not both.
We do not assume stronger- or weaker conditional correlation of signals
by high-quality media, so the outlets have no incentives to herd or antiherd
on each others reports. Indeed, they could not mimic or oppose each others
reports even if they wished, because they report simultaneously. However,
they herdon common priors, because they are concerned with their relative
reputation: an outlet would like to have reputation no lower than the other
media - otherwise, its news is redundant for the voting decision, so it is not
sold.5 This is because the decision is discrete: reminiscent of Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999), in which an information collector rewarded on decision-
basis has weak incentives to search for additional information.6
3 Basic model
Consider a game in which a monopoly media sells political news to a uniform
constituency of voters in two-periods.7 It is commonly known that the period-
specic state of the world x is either 0, with probability p > 1
2
; or 1, with
probability 1 p. The states in di¤erent periods are independent.8 Prevailing
state is hidden from the players. The voters would like to synchronize their
vote v 2 f0; 1g with the state: their payo¤ is equal to vx+ (1  v)(1  x).
Remark 1 The voters care only for picking the e¢ cient voting decision, and
not for the relative e¢ ciency of di¤erent decisions.
5Concern for relative reputation is endogenous, unlike in E¢ nger and Polborn (2001).
6To simplify exposition of limited demand for additional information, we assume
nestedinformation structure, however, this assumption is not crucial.
7Timing of the game is summarized at the end of the section.
8For notational convenience, we omit a period indicator for variable x, as well as for
other period-specic variables that we introduce later.
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xs = 1=q
0=qxs = xs -=1
1
Figure 1: Nestedinformation structure.
The media receives private signal
s =

x, if  6 q;
x+ (1  ) (1  x) , if  > q (1)
on prevaling state. The signal depends on: (i) the media quality , which
is high ( = 1) with probability 1
2
; and low ( = 0) with probability 1
2
; and
(ii) realization of random variable  drawn from uniform distribution on the
interval [0; 1], as depicted on Figure 1. The media signal is correct, unless
in the shaded region where both the media quality is low, and  lies above
threshold q.9 Distributions of parameters  or  are commonly known, but
their realizations are hidden from any player.
The media reports news n 2 f0; 1g about the state: it can report any news
regardless of its signal.10 For concreteness, we assume that being indi¤erent,
the media truthfullyreports its signal. Because we are only interested in
the media reporting when its incentives to report are controversial, we assume
that the priors are no more precise than signal by an averagequality media,
9Say, realization  6 q means that the state is easy to learn, and the media receives
correctsignal regardless of its quality; while realization  > q means that the state is
di¢ cult to learn, and the media receives correctsignal if and only if its quality is high.
10Assumption that the media does not know realizations of parameters  and  limits
the set of its feasible reporting strategies.
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but no less precise than signal by a low-quality media, that is,11
q 6 p 6 1 + q
2
. (2)
The media sells news at an arbitrary small price, which for notational con-
venience we take to be null; and it receives payo¤ that is proportional to its
readership (say, advertisers pay it a price per eyeball): for simplicity, there
is no pricing game in the model.
After the rst vote,12 the voters receive information that allows them to
update beliefs about the media quality, that is: previously reported news; and
feedbacksignal ' which is equal to the rst-period state, with probability
; and to ?, with probability 1  .
Timing of events
Nature draws the media quality .
Date 1:
a. Nature draws state x and parameter .
b. The media receives private signal s and reports news n.
c. Voters can buy news at an arbitrary small price. They vote.
d. News n becomes public. The voters receive feedback signal '. They
update their beliefs about the media quality.
Date 2: Events from date 1:a to date 1.c repeat.
11When p > 1+q2 , the media should forego its signal s and conrm the priors all the
time, because Pr (x = 0 j s = 1) = p(1 q)(1 p)(1+q)+p(1 q) lies higher than Pr (x = 1 j s = 1) =
(1 p)(1+q)
(1 p)(1+q)+p(1 q) . When p < q, the media should not care what to report because its news
is demanded even if its quality is known to be low.
12We assume that there is the vote at date 1.c only to preserve symmetry between the
periods. Otherwise, it is redundant: only drawing of the state and the media reporting
need to be repeated.
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4 Monopoly media market
Let us describe reporting in a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the game. In the last period, the media reports its signal: it has no reason to
lie. In the rst period, it chooses among four reporting strategies: (i) n = s,
call it informative reporting; (ii) n = 0, call it uninformative reporting; and
the mirror images. For concreteness, we focus on strategies (i) and (ii).
Trivially, uninformative reporting is a part of a babbling equilibrium
in which the voters learn nothing new about the media quality in the rst
period, and they buy news in the second period: by inequality (2), news by an
averagequality media is better information than the priors. Let us describe
circumstances in which informative reporting is a part of an equilibirum. We
proceed as follows: rst, we describe the second-period demand for news when
the voters believe that the media reports its signal at date 1.c; then, we nd
the range of parameters for which the media does not deviate from reporting
its signal at date 1.c given this demand.
Media reputation and demand for news The voters buy news at
date 2 if and only if they perceive it being more informative than the priors:
q + (1  q) Pr ( = 1 j '; n) > p. (3)
Their demand for news is non-decreasing in their posteriors Pr ( = 1 j '; n)
about the media quality, call them the media reputation, as it appears in the
left-hand-side of inequality (3). By Bayes rule, we nd
Pr ( = 1 j ' = x; n = x) > Pr ( = 1 j ' = ?; n = 0) >
Pr ( = 1 j ' = ?; n = 1) > Pr ( = 1 j ' = x; n 6= x) . (4)
That is, the media reputation is the highest, when previously reported news
is correct (n = ' = x); and the lowest, when it is incorrect (n 6= ' = x),
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because the media signal may be mistaken only if its quality is low. Further-
more, the media reputation is the second-highest, when news is conrmatory
(n = 0, ' = ?); and the second-lowest, when it is unsupportive, (n = 1,
' = ?), because the media receives signal 0 with a higher probability
when its quality is high (the priors are informative):
p > pq + (1  p)(1  q). (5)
The more precise the priors, less eager the voters are to buy news, as it
appears in the right-hand-side of inequality (3): recall Remark 1. As long as
the prior probability that vote 0is e¢ cient lies below threshold13
p =
1 + q2   (1  q)
p
1 + q2
2q
, (6)
they buy news, unless the previous report is clearly wrong; otherwise, they
buy news only if the previous report is either correct or at least conrmatory.
Lemma 1 When the voters believe that n = s, their second-period demand
is as follows. When p < p, where threshold p is given by equation (6), they
buy news unless n 6= ' = x. When p > p, they buy news either if n = ' = x
or else if both n = 0 and ' = ?, but not otherwise.
Pandering to the future demand Because the media is paid per
eyeball, it panders date 1.c news to the future demand described by Lemma
1. Does it report its signal? Obviously yes, if the signal is 0: news 0is
likely to be correct, and it conrms the priors. The answer is less obvious if
the signal is 1. The answer is still positive when the priors are su¢ ciently
di¤used (p < p), so that the media would only like to report no incorrect news
(its signal should be more informative than common priors). However, when
the priors are more precise (p > p), the media would like to report either
correct or conrmatory news. Therefore, it reports news 1if and only if
13Threshold p and all thresholds that we nd hereafter are depicted on Figure 2.
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the probability that this news turns out to be correct (' = x = 1) lies no
lower than the probability that either it turns out to be wrong (' = x = 0)
or it remains unclear whether it is correct or not (' = ?). That is,
 Pr (x = 1 j s = 1) >  Pr (x = 0 j s = 1) + 1  . (7)
This incentive constraint is met if and only if both: the follow-up feedback
on the quality of news is a likely event ( > 1
2
); and precision of the priors
lies no higher than threshold
pm =
(2   1) (1 + q)
(2   1) (1 + q) + 1  q . (8)
(threshold pm lies above threshold p when  >
1+q+
p
1+q2
2+2q
, but not otherwise;
for example, in the upper layers on Figure 2, but not in the lower layer).
Proposition 1 (quality of a monopoly media news) A monopoly me-
dia reporting is informative either if p < p, where threshold p is given by
equation (6); or else if both  > 1
2
and p 6 pm, where threshold pm is given
by equation (8).
In words, a monopoly media reports informative news if and only if the
priors on the issue that it covers are su¢ ciently di¤used. Note that the quality
of news is increasing in the quality of the media signal (both thresholds pm
and p are increasing in q); and it is non-decreasing in the probability that
the voters can assess the quality of reported news (threshold pm is increasing
in ). Importantly, when the priors are su¢ ciently di¤used (p < p), news is
informative even if the voters cannot assess its quality.
5 Competitive media market
Let us extend our basic model to a game with two outlets in the market,
index them with i = 1; 2, and let index  i refers to the competitor by outlet
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i. At the beginning of the game, Nature independently draws their qualities
from the same distribution as the quality of a monopoly media in the basic
game. Events at date 1.a are the same as in the basic game. At date 1.b, the
outlets receive private signals on the state: signal si by outlet i depends on
its quality i and realization of parameter , as it is described by system of
equations (1) with s and  being indexed with i. The outlets simultaneously
report news: ni 2 f0; 1g denotes news by outlet i (as in the basic game,
the media can report any news regardless of its signal). At date 1.c, the
voters can buy either report or both reports (each report is available at an
arbitrary small price), and they vote. At date 1.d, the reported news becomes
public, the voters receive either perfect or empty feedback signal ', and
they update their beliefs about the media quality. At date 2, the events from
date 1:a to date 1.c repeat.
Let us describe circumstances in which the duopoly media market sustains
symmetric equilibrium with informative reporting, and compare our insights
to Proposition 1. We proceed as in the previous section: rst, we describe
the second-period demand for news based on beliefs that date 1.c reporting
is informative; then, we nd parameters for which an outlet does not deviate
from informative reporting given this demand.
Buy two-, one-, or no reports? At date 2, the voters have three
undominated strategies: (i) buy no news and vote 0; (ii) buy news by the
media with the highest reputation, and vote as it reports; (iii) buy news by
both outlets and vote 0unless they both report 1. Strategy (ii) is more
e¢ cient than strategy (i) if and only if
q + (1  q)max
i=1;2
fPr (i = 1 j '; n1; n2)g > p: (9)
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this is straightforward generalization of inequality (3). Strategy (iii) is more
e¢ cient than than strategy (i) if and only if
q + (1  q) ((1  p) Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j '; n1; n2)+
+p (1  Pr (1 = 2 = 0 j '; n1; n2)) > p; (10)
and it is more e¢ cient than strategy (ii) if and only if
(1  p) Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j '; n1; n2) + p (1  Pr (1 = 2 = 0 j '; n1; n2)) >
> max
i=1;2
fPr (i = 1 j '; n1; n2)g . (11)
Indeed, strategy (iii) is e¢ cient in the following circumstances: the media
receives correct signal regardless of its quality ( 6 q); only a high-quality
media receives correct signal ( > q), and either the state is 1and both
outlets have high quality (x = 1, 1 = 2 = 1), or the state is 0and at
least one outlet has high quality (x = 1, 1 + 2 > 0). Hence, the expected
e¢ ciency of strategy (iii) is equal to the left-hand-side of inequality (10).
If date 1.c reports di¤er, the voters attribute di¤erent reputations to the
outlets, and they buy news only by the outlet with a higher reputation: re-
call remark 1 (formally, inequality (9) is met, and inequality (11) is violated).
The winner of the market is the outlet that has reported correct news, if the
voters can assess its quality; otherwise, it is the outlet that has reported
conrmatory news.
Lemma 2 (exclusive readership) When the voters believe that ni = si,
and n1 6= n2, in the second period they buy only news by the outlet that has
reported: (i) x, if ' = x; (ii) 0otherwise.
When date 1.c reports are the same, the outlets share the same reputation.
If the reports are clearly wrong, the reputation is null, and the voters buy no
news. Otherwise, the voters prefer to crosscheck news rather than to relying
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on just one report (inequality (11) is met). Do the voters crosscheck news or
simply vote 0(is inequality (10) met)? They crosscheck news if previously
reported news is correct or at least conrmatory. If it is unsupportive, the
voters crosscheck news, if and only if precision of the priors p lies no higher
than threshold
p =
1 + 3q2   (1  q)
p
1 + 3q2
2q(1 + q)
. (12)
Remark 2 Threshold p lies above threshold p that is given by equation (6),
as depicted on Figure 2.
The reason is that news by di¤erent outlets with the same reputation is
complementary, hence, easier to sell than just one report, in particular when
previously reported news is unsupportive.
Lemma 3 (multioutlet readership) When the voters believe that ni = si,
and n1 = n2, they buy news by both outlels at date 2 if n1 = n2 = ' = x; or
if both n1 = n2 = 0 and ' = ?; or else if n1 = n2 = 1, ' = ? and p < p,
where threshold p is given by equation (12). Otherwise, they buy no news.
Reporting by a competing media outlet Does an outlet report its
signal at date 1.c when its future readership is described by Lemmas 2 and 3?
As in the monopoly media case, the answer is yes, if the signal is 0, and
maybeif it is 1. When the priors are very precise (p > p), an outlet faces
the same incentives as if it was alone in the market: it sells news at date 2
if and only if its rst-period report is either correct or at least conrmatory.
Hence, it reports its signal if and only if precision p of the priors lies no higher
than threshold pm that is given by equation (13). When the priors are less
precise (p < p), an outlet has weaker incentives to conrm them, because it
may sell its news after unsupportive report if report by the other outlet is
also unsupportive. When outlet i receives signal 1, it reports 1 if and
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only if14
 Pr (x = 1 j si = 1)+(1  ) Pr (s i = 1 j si = 1) >  Pr (x = 0 j si = 1)+(1  ) ;
(13)
or, equivalently, if and only if p lies below threshold
pc =
 (3 + q) + q   1
4
. (14)
Remark 3 Threshold pc lies below threshold pm, as depicted on Figure 2,
because inequality (13) is weaker than inequality (7).
Proposition 2 (quality of a duopoly media news) A duopoly media mar-
ket sustains informative reporting either if (i) p < p 6 pc where threshold p
is given by equation (6) and threshold pc is given by equation (14); or else if
(ii) both  > 1
2
and p 6 pm, where threshold pm is given by equation (8).
Competition in the media and quality of news Let us compare
Propositions 1 and 2 to see which market structure is more e¢ cient in eliciting
information from the media. Remarks 2 and 3 hint at the following three
possibilities. (i) Threshold pc given by equation (14) lies below threshold p
given by equation (6), or, equivalently,  lies below threshold
 =
2
p
1 + q2 + 2  q
4 + 3q
, (15)
as depicted in the lower layer on Figure 2. (ii) Threshold pc lies at least as
high as threshold p, but threshold pm given by equation (8) lies lower than
threshold p given by equation (6); equivalently,  lies no lower than threshold
, but lower than threshold
 =
1 + q +
p
1 + 3q2
2 + 2q
, (16)
14We index the incentive constraint (7) with i and add term (1  ) Pr (s i = 1 j si = 1)
to its left-hand-side.
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Figure 2: A monopoly media market sustains informative reporting in dark
shaded areas. A duopoly media market sustains informative reporting in
light shaded areas. Higher layers correspond to higher values of parameter .
as depicted in the intermediate layer on Figure 2. (iii) Threshold pm lies
at least as high as threshold p, or, equivalently,  lies at least as high as
threshold : this situation is illustrated by the upper layer on Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that competition in the media has an ambigous impact
on the quality of news. In the lower left cell, competitive pressures make it
more di¢ cult to sustain informative reporting. The reason is that the priors
are su¢ ciently di¤used (p < p), and so the voters are eager to learn more
about the prevailing state. If there is only one outlet in the market, they
buy news, unless previously reported news is clearly incorrect. Therefore, the
media reports its signal which is likely to be correct. When there are two
outlets in the market, the voters can choose the source of news. Therefore,
each outlet faces a more elastic demand: it rewards either correct- or at least
conrmatory reports. Because it is quite unlikely that the voters can assess
whether reported news is correct or not ( < ), the outlets easily engage in
conrmatory reporting.
Remark 4 (premium for exclusive readership) If we assume (following
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Ambrus and Reisinger, 2006) that advertizers pay a higher price per eyeball
of an exclusive reader than per eyeballof a multioutlet reader, competitive
pressures induce conrmatory reporting even more (see the Appndix).
In the central cell on Figure 2, the situation is reverced: news is more
informative when there are two outlets in the market. Indeed, vote 0 is
quite likely to be correct (p > p). When there is one outlet in the market, the
voters are pickyabout buying its report: they buy it if previously reported
news is either correct, or at least conrmatory; otherwise they simply vote
0. The voters are more inclined to buy two reports (lets check whether
at least one of them conrms that vote 0 is e¢ cient). Therefore, they
create weaker incentives to conrm the priors when there are two outlets in
the market.
For all other values of parameters p and , either media market structure
is equally e¢ cient in sustaining informative reporting. Note that this means
that a duopoly market delivers more information to the voters, because the
probability of event that an outlet receives correct signal is increasing in the
number of outlets in the market.
Corollary A monopoly media market is more e¢ cient in sustaining infor-
mative reporting than a duopoly media market when both p < p and  < ,
where threshold p is given by equation (6), and threshold  is given by equa-
tion (15). The opposite is true when both  <  <  and p < p < p, where
threshold p is given by equation (12), and threshold  is given by equation
(16).15 For all other values of parameters p and , either media market
structure is equally e¢ cient in eliciting information from the media.
15The higher the quality of the media signal, the larger scope for the competition: both
thresholds p and  are increasing in q, while threshold  is decreasing in q.
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6 Applications and extentions:
concluding discussion
According to the above corollary, competition may help to elicit information
from the media if common priors on the issues covered by news are su¢ -
ciently precise, or the follow-up quality assessment is a likely event. How-
ever, if news concerns controversial issues, and it is hardly possible to asses
its quality, competitive pressures induce conrmatory reporting. This is our
main insight. Let us outline some issues for the future research.
News coverage One possible line of research is to endogenize news
coverage, and investigate how it depends on the media market structure.
Even at a rst glance, there are many interesting e¤ects. If we focus on
the media coverage decision prior to information receival, we may nd that
a monopoly outlet covers issues on which the priors are di¤used, so as not
to engage in conrmatory reporting taking a risk of being detected; while a
competitive outlet covers issues on which the priors are more precise, so as
to take a chance of winning reputational leadership by conrming them.
If selective reporting of available information is concerned, we may nd
that competition in the media helps to detect slantingof relevant informa-
tion when it takes place. Say, the media receives signals on two issues, and
then reports on one issue - either one it chooses to cover. News coverage is
important when the media signal on only one issue does not conrm common
priors: ideally, the media should aware the voters about it. A monopoly me-
dia, however, is not going to report news contradicting common priors on one
issue when it can conrm them on the other issue: this is safer, because
the signal conrming the priors is more likely to be correct. A competing
media, has at least some incentives to report unpopularbut relevant news,
because its rival may report it and this report may turn out to be correct.
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Voter competence and quality of news Furthermore, it could be
interesting to investigate the impact of voter competence on the quality of
news, depending on the media market structure. The voters who receive
their own information may provide stronger reputational concerns, hence, the
incentives to conrm the priors when the media is a monopoly, because they
have relatively low demand for news. At the same time, they may increase
the quality of news in a competitive media environment, because they assess
it on the basis of not just common priors, but also their own signal. A further
step could be considering voters di¤erentiated in competence: because they
attribute reputation to the media in di¤erent ways, competition may lead to
di¤erentiation in quality of news.
News and political accountability News inuences policy choices
by elected o¢ cials (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Snyder and Strömberg, 2004;
Strömberg 2001, 2004). Does the media work as a watchdogpromoting
socially e¢ cient governance? Straightforward reinterpretation of our corol-
lary tells that the answer is ambiguous: political news may decrease bias in
public policy towards popular or à priori e¢ cient, when common priors
are su¢ ciently precise or the probability of ex post feedback is su¢ ciently
high; and increase this bias otherwise. It su¢ ces to assume that a politician
has reputational concerns similar to the media outlet (because she would like
to win re-election); the voters update their beliefs upon her and the media
ability to identify socially e¢ cient public policy on the basis of previously
reported news and policy choices; and they decide upon re-election and their
demand for news depending on these beliefs. The counterpart of a monopoly
media reporting is the politicians behaviour in a hypothetical environment
without the media. The counterpart of a duopoly media reporting, is her
behaviour when the media reports political news.
We hope that these preliminary considerations may motivate the future
20
research on issues that concern the media performance.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
By Bayes rule: Pr ( = 1 j ' = x; n = x) = 1
1 + q
; (17)
Pr ( = 1 j ' = ?; n = 0) = p
p(1 + q) + (1  p)(1  q) ; (18)
Pr ( = 1 j ' = ?; n = 1) = 1  p
(1  p)(1 + q) + p(1  q) ; (19)
Pr ( = 1 j ' = x; n 6= x) = 0. (20)
Posteriors given by equations (17)-(20) are ordered by set of inequalities (4).
Suppose that n = 0 and ' = ?. By equation (18), inequality (10) is met
at both limits of interval (2). By monotonicity:
@
@p
Pr ( = 1 j ' = ?; n = 0) = 1  q
(p(1 + q) + (1  p)(1  q))2 > 0, (21)
it is met for any p in interval (2). By inequality (4), it is also met for any
p in interval (2) when n = ' = x. Suppose that n = 0 and ' = ?. By
equation (19), inequality (10) is met when p = q, but not when p = 1+q
2
. By
monotonicity:
@
@p
Pr ( = 1 j ' = ?; n = 1) =   1  q
((1  p)(1 + q) + p(1  q))2 < 0, (22)
there exist threshold p such that inequality (3) is met when p < p, but not
when p 6 p < 1+q
2
. This threshold equalizes the left- and the right-hand-side
of inequality (3) for ' = ?; n = 1. It is given by equation (6). It remains to
note that inequality (3) is not met when ' = x 6= n for any p in interval (2).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The media reports n = s at date 1.c if and only if it delivers at least as high
expected demand for news at date 2 as reporting n 6= s. Using Lemma 1 to
describe date 2 demand for news, we nd that if s = 0, the media reporting
is informative is and only if:
1   +  Pr (x = 0 j s = 0) > 1   +  Pr (x = 1 j s = 0) (23)
in the region where p < p; and
 Pr (x = 0 j s = 0) + 1   >  Pr (x = 1 j s = 0) (24)
in the region where p 6 p < 1+q
2
. Both inequalities (23) and (24) are true,
because
Pr (x = 0 j s = 0) = p(1 + q)
p(1 + q) + (1  p)(1  q) (25)
(computed by Bayes rule) lies higher than
Pr (x = 1 j s = 0) = (1  p)(1  q)
p(1 + q) + (1  p)(1  q) . (26)
Suppose that s = 1. When p < p, the media reporting is informative if and
only if
1   +  Pr (x = 1 j s = 1) > 1   +  Pr (x = 0 j s = 1) ;
which is equivalent to true inequality 1 + q > 2p: once again, we use Bayes
rule to nd
Pr (x = 1 j s = 1) = (1  p)(1 + q)
(1  p)(1 + q) + p(1  q) , and (27)
Pr (x = 0 j s = 1) = p(1  q)
(1  p)(1 + q) + p(1  q) . (28)
When p 6 p < 1+q
2
, the media reports n = s if and only if inequality (7)
is met, which by equations (27) and (28) is equivalent to both  > 1
2
and
(2 1)(1+q)(1 p) > p (1  q), or, after doing some straightforward algebra,
to both  > 1
2
and (8).
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
By Bayes rule, Pr (i = 1 j ni = x; n i 6= x; ' = x) = 1; (29)
Pr (1 = 2 = 0 j '; n1 6= n2) = Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j '; n1 6= n2) = 0; (30)
Pr (i = 1 j ni = 0; n i = 1; ' = ?) = p: (31)
When ni = 0; n i = 1, ' = ? inequality (11) is violated by equations (30)
and (31), while inequality (9) is met. The same is true when ni = x; n i 6= x:
see equations (30) and (29).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
By Bayes rule: Pr (i = 1 j n1 = n2 6= ' = x) = 0; (32)
Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j n1 = n2 = 1; ' = ?) = 1  p
(1  p) (1 + 3q) + p (1  q) ; (33)
Pr (1 = 2 = 0 j n1 = n2 = 1; ' = ?) = p (1  q) + q (1  p)
(1  p) (1 + 3q) + p (1  q) ; (34)
Pr (i = 1 j n1 = n2 = 1; ' = ?) = (1  p) (1 + q)
(1  p) (1 + 3q) + p (1  q) ; (35)
Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j n1 = n2 = 0; ' = ?) = p
p (1 + 3q) + (1  p) (1  q) ; (36)
Pr (1 = 2 = 0 j n1 = n2 = 0; ' = ?) = pq + (1  q) (1  p)
p (1 + 3q) + (1  p) (1  q) ; (37)
Pr (i = 1 j n1 = n2 = 0; ' = ?) = p(1 + q)
p (1 + 3q) + (1  p) (1  q) ; (38)
Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j n1 = n2 = ' = x) = 1
1 + 3q
; (39)
Pr (1 = 2 = 0 j n1 = n2 = ' = x) = q
1 + 3q
; (40)
Pr (i = 1 j n1 = n2 = ' = x) = 1 + q
1 + 3q
. (41)
1. Suppose that n1 = n2 = ' = x. By equations (39)-(41), we nd, after
doing some algebra, that inequality (11) is equivalent to 2p > 1, which is true.
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By equations (39) and (40), we nd, that the left-hand-side of inequality (10)
lies higher than q+1
2
. Hence, this inequality is met (recall inequalities (2)).
2. Suppose that n1 = n2 = 0; ' = ?. By equations (36)-(38), inequality (11)
is equivalent to 2p > 1. By equations (36) and (37), the left-hand-side of
inequality (10) lies above q+1
2
if and only if 2p(1 + 2pq) > 2pq + 1  q, which
is true.
3. Suppose that n1 = n2 = 1; ' = ?. By equations (33)-(35), inequality (11)
is equivalent to 2p > 1 (true). Using equations (33) and (34) evaluated at the
extremes of interval (2), we nd that inequality (10) is met when p = q, but
not when p = 1+q
2
. The di¤erence between the left- and the right-hand-side
of this inequality decreases in p:
sign

@
@p
((1  p) Pr (1 = 2 = 1 j '; n1; n2)  pPr (1 = 2 = 0 j '; n1; n2))

=
= sign

1  2pq + q2  (1  2p)2 + 2  2p > 0 for p 6 1+q
2
. Threshold p
given by equation (12) equalizes the left- and the right-hand-side of inequality
(10) for n1 = n2 = 1; ' = ?: the voters crosscheck news when p < p, and
they read no news otherwise.
4. When n1 = n2 6= x, neither inequality (10) or (11) is met, by equation
(32).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
By Bayes rule, Pr (s i = 1 j si = 1) = (3q + 1)(1  p) + p(1  q)
2 ((1  p)(1 + q) + p(1  q)) . (42)
Consider interval p < p. Using equations (27), (28),16 and (42), and do-
ing some straightforward algebra we nd that the incentive compatibility
constraint (13) is met if and only if p 6 pc, where threshold pc is given by
equation (14).
16We index equations (27) and (28) with i.
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A.6 Proof of Remark 4
Let us normalize the media advertizing revenue per multioutlet reader to
1, and denote with B > 1 the revenue per exclusive reader. Trivially, a
premium for exclusive readership does not change anything for a monopoly
media market, where all readers are exclusive. However, it creates additional
incentives to conrm the priors in a duopoly media market. Indeed, the
counterpart of the media incentive constraint (13) is a stronger inequality:
 (B Pr (x = 1; s i = 0 j si = 1) + Pr (x = 1; s i = 1 j si = 1))+
+ (1  ) Pr (s i = 1 j si = 1) > (Pr (x = 0; s i = 0 j si = 1))+
B Pr (x = 0; s i = 1 j si = 1))+(1  ) (B Pr (s i = 1 j si = 1) + Pr (s i = 0 j si = 1)) .
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